Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems by Constand, Richard L. et al.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 1
Issue 1 Spring 1991 Article 3
December 1991
Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the
Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems
Richard L. Constand
University of Hawaii, Manoa
Jerome S. Osteryoung
Florida State University
Donald A. Nast
Florida State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Constand, Richard L.; Osteryoung, Jerome S.; and Nast, Donald A. (1991) "Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the
Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems," Journal of Small Business Finance: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, pp. 15-28.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol1/iss1/3
Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts 
and the Resolution of Debt-Related 
Agency Problems
Richard L. Constand 
Jerome S. Osteryoung 
Donald A. Nast
Small firms that do not have access to organized financial markets must often 
rely on secured commercial loans for their debt financing. In large firms, debt- 
related agency problems are often resolved through the bond pricing process in 
the formal debt markets. When these same debt-related agency problems arise in 
small, private firms, the structure of the secured lending agreement must resolve 
these problems. This study identifies debt-related agency problems as they exist 
in private firms and examines howf the lending agreement resolves these problems.
INTRODUCTION
Financial theory is usually developed within the context of large, publicly 
traded firms operating in a perfect market environment. In the Agency 
literature, much of the work examines the debt-related agency problems 
associated with the financing of large firms. Small firms, however, do not 
have access to the formal debt markets and are forced to rely on revolving 
secured commercial loans for much of their debt capital. In these situations, 
the secured lending agreement must reduce or eliminate the debt-related 
agency costs. The purpose of this current paper is to focus attention on how 
secured loan agreements affect debt-related agency problems in small, 
privately owned firms.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, a general review 
of the theory of agency is presented. The second section examines revolving 
Asset-Based Loan (ABL) arrangements used by many privately owned firms 
as their dominant source of debt financing. In the third section, the debt- 
related agency problem literature is reviewed and similar problems are 
identified in firms using ABL financing. It is also shown how the structure
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of the revolving loan agreement resolves these problems w^ithout the need 
of a market pricing mechanism. The final section contains a summary and 
conclusions.
16 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 1(1) 1991
I. AGENCY THEORY 
Accounting Theory of Agency
Baiman [2] defines the basic accounting related agency problem as the 
construction of a Pareto-optimal employment contract. The ideal contract 
is a “first best” contract that is self-enforcing and results in an optimal level 
of effort by the agent and an optimal distribution of risk betv^ e^en the agent 
and the principal without any associated information or monitoring costs. 
A  “second best” contract is an optimal situation given a specific information 
set and is a result of the balance between the value added to the firm from 
the use of additional information and the cost of obtaining that information. 
Since information is costly, the achievement of a second best contract is 
considered optimal and is accomplished using managerial accounting 
systems to gather information and monitor the agent’s activities.
Financial Theory of Agency
Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet [4] describe agency problems as productive 
inefficiencies that arise from conflicting interests of various parties associated 
with the financing and management of a corporation. The three categories 
of participants—owners, managers and external financiers—act in their own 
self interest, thus creating various agency problems.
These agency problems and their resolution within the corporate 
environment have been examined by a number of authors. Jensen and 
Meckling [14] discuss how the inclusion of debt in the capital structure of 
the firm can induce owner/managers to invest in high risk projects in an 
attempt to expropriate wealth from bondholders. Ross [24] and Leland and 
Pyle [15] discuss the agency problems associated with the existence of 
asymmetric information and discuss the role of signaling to the markets in 
the resolution of those problems. Haugen and Senbet discuss bankruptcy 
costs as an offset to the tax benefits of debt financing and the implications 
for capital structure. Myers [16] shows that with debt in the capital structure 
a firm’s owner may underinvest by foregoing positive net present value 
projects if the incremental benefits associated with the projects accrue only 
to the debtholders of the firm. Within the Myers framework, rational 
bondholders recognize this risk and lower the price they are willing to pay
for the bonds, thus forcing owners to bear the associated costs. Barnea, 
Haugen, and Senbet [5] argue that the pricing mechanism in the formal debt 
markets resolves this type of problem. Ang [1] examines the opposite case 
in which a firm overinvests in underutilized physical assets and the market 
for corporate restructuring resolves the problem. Most of this existing work 
focuses on the agency problems in large public firms that raise funds from 
external sources. In these situations, the problems are resolved through the 
security market pricing function. Many firms, however, do not issue publicly 
traded securities but still need to obtain debt financing from external sources 
such as commercial lenders. This situation allows agency problems to 
develop in an environment with no formal mairket discipline. In these 
situations, second-best contracts of the type described in the Accounting 
literature are needed to minimize the related agency costs.
Small Firm Agency Theory
Research on small firm agency problems is scarce. Hand, Lloyd, and 
Rogow [11] examine the resolutions of agency problems brought about by 
conflicts between insider owner/managers and non-insider minority equity 
holders in the small firm context. They also discuss how a stockholders’ 
agreement that is executed at the time of organization can be structured in 
such a way as to reduce many of these small firm agency problems. Issues 
that can be dealt with in the stockholders’ agreement include limits on 
managerial compensation, limits on dividends, and restrictions that guard 
against dilution of existing shareholders’ control over the firm.
Pettit and Singer [22], in a review of small firm research topics, discuss 
the direct and indirect costs of small firm debt financing. They also note 
that they know of no existing research focusing on debt-related agency 
problems in small firms and suggest that the structure of secured, heavily 
monitored, short term loans to small firms is most likely a response to the 
need to control these problems. Revolving ABL arrangements have the 
specific characteristics described by Pettit and Singer.
Constand, Osteryoung, and Nast [8] empirically examine the 
relationships between small firm characteristics and the use of leverage in 
firms that use revolving asset-based loans as a source of financing. They 
interpret their results within the context of large firm agency theory and find 
that many factors identified by other authors as affecting leverage in large 
firms do not affect the use of leverage in small firms. These past studies 
indicate a clear need for an examination of the relationship between agency 
problems and small firm debt financing.
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II. REVOLVING ASSET-BASED LOAN FINANCING
Herskowitz and Kaplowitz [13] describe the revolving ABL process as a 
financing arrangement in which a bank has agreed to supply continuous 
secured financing to the borrower over a three to five year period. The 
financing is collateralized by current assets such as accounts receivable and 
inventory and the amount of the established credit line at any point in time 
is based on a percentage “advance rate” of the balances of the eligible working 
capital assets. The advance rate for eligible receivables is usually 70 to 80 
percent of book value; the advance rate for eligible inventory is usually 30 
to 40 percent of book value. Since the assets used to secure the loan are highly 
liquid, the lender closely monitors the activities of the borrower. The ABL 
process is discussed at length in books by Clark [6] and Robinson [23] and 
in numerous articles (see Stacy [25], Barbarosh and Tong [3], English [9], 
Gilbert [10], Herskowitz and Kaplowitz [13], Pendley [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] and 
Constand [7]).
In a revolving ABL arrangement, the borrower and lender must balance 
their immediate self interest against the long-term benefits associated with 
cooperative behavior. For the borrower, the loan covenants and the 
monitoring activities of the lender may, at first, seem excessive. Furthermore, 
there are explicit financing costs associated with the financing arrangement. 
The explicit costs associated with ABL financing are very high and usually 
consist of paying an interest rate 2% to 4% over the prime rate and paying 
various fees that cover the costs of the lender’s monitoring activities. In most 
cases, however, the firm’s restricted access to the organized financial markets 
makes the costs associated with formal debt issues or equity even higher than 
those associated with ABL financing. In such cases, the borrowers have no 
other rational choice.
Although revolving ABL financing does have disadvantages associated 
with its structure, it also provides a flexible form of external debt financing 
for the private firm. Over the short term the amount of funds fluctuates to 
meet seasonal demands for working capital. Over the longer term, as the firm 
grows, increased debt financing is made available to fund the required 
increases in permanent working capital investment.
From the lender’s point of view, the lender is at risk for possible losses 
arising from the activities of the borrower. This risk for the lender arises from 
a number of debt-related agency problems. Although the lender could avoid 
these risks by refusing to extend loans to a firm, the lender would also sacrifice 
the associated fee and interest income. It is in the best interest of the lender 
to extend the loan and properly manage the associated risk through the 
structure of the lending agreement.
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III. ASSET-BASED LENDING AND AGENCY THEORY
Most firms involved in the ABL process are private corporations whose 
common stock is not pubhcly traded and whose debt obligations are usually 
collateralized commercial loans rather than formal debt issues. This ABL 
type of financing results in a complex agency relationship with the lender 
as principal and the borrower as agent. Without the market to resolve agency 
problems, an ABL Security Agreement must provide a solution. This 
Security Agreement is a standardized legal document that is structured under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). It describes the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties to the revolving financing agreement and 
can be considered a second-best contract that significantly reduces debt- 
related agency problems.
Informational Asymmetry
Informational asymmetry exists when managers (or owner/managers) 
possess information about the true nature of the firm that outsiders do not 
have (see Ross [24] and Leland and Pyle [15]). If a firm is privately owned 
and managed and the owner/manager seeks external sources of funding, this 
information gap must be bridged by the owner/manager so the true value 
of the firm is revealed to potential investors. The agency costs associated with 
this process are borne by the owner/manager.
The owner/manager’s choice of external funding is between equity or 
debt. If equity funding is chosen, there are numerous costs involved. First, 
there are direct issue costs, such as investment banker fees, associated with 
identifying potential investors and informing them about the value of the 
firm. Second, there are indirect issue costs due to the tendency for equity 
markets to underprice new issues as a result of ambiguous signaling of the 
firm’s true value. Furthermore, there are additional costs such as the portion 
of future residual profits to be paid to the new shareholders. Finally, the 
existing tax structure penalizes equity financing through the double taxation 
of dividends.
If the owner/manager of a privately held firm seeks external debt 
financing rather than equity financing, the direct issue costs and the indirect 
costs associated with ambiguous signaling to external debtors still exist. The 
other costs of equity financing do not apply in that there is no sharing of 
future residual profits and rather than a tax disadvantage, there exists a tax 
subsidy from the tax shield effect. Because of these lower costs, debt financing 
is often preferred over equity issues. However, the cost of issuing debt 
securities is still prohibitive for relatively small, privately held corporations. 
Fortunately, the direct costs of issuing formal debt securities can be avoided
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if the debt financing is obtained from commercial lenders. With commercial 
loans, the only costs associated with the existence of asymmetric information 
are the costs of informing the lenders about the true state of the firm. 
Furthermore, since commercial lenders work closely with borrowers and have 
developed efficient methods of monitoring the borrower’s actions, the 
monitoring costs may be less than those associated with small firm debt 
issues. This point was well made by Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow [11].
If a firm relies on a revolving ABL for its debt financing, two aspects 
of the structure of the lending agreement reduce the asymmetric information 
problem. First, the initial audit of the borrower’s assets provide the lender 
with the information required to decide if a loan will be made. Second, the 
monitoring performed periodically by the lender keeps the lender informed 
about changes in the borrower’s assets.
The initial audit is performed by the lender before the decision to extend 
a revolving ABL and involves a financial analysis of the firm’s accounting 
records and verification of the assets to be used as collateral. Verification 
involves on-site visits and telephone interviews with the borrower’s credit 
customers. This initial audit process allows the lender to gather needed 
information prior to the lending decision, reduces the information 
asymmetry, and allows a rational debt pricing schedule to be devised. The 
costs involved with this audit are often included in the loan fee structure 
or embedded in the interest charges.
Once a revolving credit has been established, the possibility exists that 
the information gap between the borrower and the lender will increase as 
time passes. To prevent this from happening, the ABL arrangement requires 
continual disclosure of firm specific information to the lender. This 
disclosure process is described in the Security Agreement and requires the 
borrower to keep extensive financial records and to allow the lender 
unrestricted access to those records. When revolving ABLs are collateralized 
by inventory and receivables whose balances change daily, the lender is 
informed at the close of each business day of the new account balances. This 
daily reporting allows the lender to recalculate the value of collateral and 
adjust the lending limits. Furthermore, the process allows the lender to keep 
fully appraised of the firm’s value. The costs of this monitoring process are 
passed on to the borrower and represent the costs of reducing the asymmetric 
information problem.
Bankruptcy and Loan Default
One of the debt-related agency costs is the cost associated with 
bankruptcy. Haugen and Senbet [12] (H&S hereafter) examine the issue of 
bankruptcy and the resulting impact on the existence of an optimal capital
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Structure. H&S define bankruptcy as the chain of events in which the firm 
fails to meet its fixed payment obhgations and the firm’s creditors take legal 
possession of the firm. They classify the associated costs of the ownership 
transfer as direct or indirect. Direct costs are legal, accounting, and trustee 
fees associated with the transfer of ownership. Indirect costs are the 
opportunity costs of the interruption of the firm’s sales revenues during the 
ownership transfer. H&S also argue that the decision to liquidate the assets 
of the firm is a pure capital budgeting decision whose costs should not be 
included as bankruptcy costs. H&S argue that the owners could avoid the 
formal transfer of ownership by selling new equity shares and using the 
proceeds to repurchase the outstanding fixed claims on the firm at a fair 
market price. With this option, the true costs of bankruptcy would be the 
lesser of the costs of the forced, formal ownership transfer or the transactions 
costs of the restructuring of the firm prior to a forced ownership transfer.
The discussion of bankruptcy by H&S is not applicable to firms that 
rely on revolving ABLs due to the definition of bankruptcy and the process 
of informal reorganization of the firm. In the H&S scenario, default on the 
debt agreement precipitates either bankruptcy or an informal reorganization 
of the firm that avoids bankruptcy. When a revolving ABL is used, default 
is a separate event from bankruptcy. Furthermore, since the small firm cannot 
issue formal securities, the firm has no option to reorganize informally.
Default within the context of a revolving ABL is not a generic concept 
that applies to all firms using debt financing. Instead, the specific actions 
that constitute default are defined in the Security Agreement that describes 
the rights and obligations of both parties involved in a particular financing 
relationship. Legal, accounting, and trustee expenses identified as direct costs 
of bankruptcy by H&S are actually default related costs when ABLs are used. 
These various costs are controlled through the ABL monitoring structure.
If an ABL agreement is structured under Article 9 of the UCC and 
evidence of the agreement is registered with the appropriate governmental 
agency, the secured lender has established contingent legal rights in the 
collateralized assets owned by the borrowers. If default occurs the lender can 
take immediate possession of the assets, liquidate them, and use the proceeds 
for repayment of the outstanding debt. Since receivables often provide the 
majority of the ABL collateral, a special deposit account called a collateral 
account is used to insure that the lender controls the cash proceeds of the 
collateralized receivables.
The ABL Security Agreement usually requires that all payments on 
receivables accounts be mailed directly to a lockbox controlled by the lender. 
The lender endorses the payments and deposits them into the collateral 
account. Periodically, the balance of this account is applied against the balance 
of the revolving loan. If the borrower acts in such a way that constitutes default,
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legal ownership of the collateralized receivables is immediately transferred to 
the lender and the lender informs the borrower’s account debtors that payments 
should continue to be made as they have in the past. As the outstanding 
receivables are repaid, the proceeds are applied against the outstanding loan 
balance. Since the loan funds advanced only represented 80% of eligible 
receivables, the entire outstanding loan balance is usually repaid.
Given this aspect of the ABL structure, the legal costs of default are 
minimal or non-existent. Furthermore, since ownership of the collateralized 
assets can be transferred to the secured lender without bankruptcy, there are 
no trustee related costs. Even if bankruptcy occurs simultaneously with 
default, the legal claim held by the secured lender on the collateralized assets 
ranks ahead of the claims of bankruptcy trustees and trustee related costs do 
not impact the debtholders. Finally, since the structure of the lending 
arrangement requires daily monitoring of the borrower’s books by the lender, 
the accounting costs of default are immaterial.
Investment in High Risk Projects
Jensen and Meckling [14] (J&M hereafter) explain the tendency for 
owner/managers who operate firms utilizing financial leverage to invest in 
high risk projects. The use of debt financing by the owner/manager is viewed 
as a European Call Option on the residual value of the firm. The debt 
repayment represents the strike or exercise price of the call option and the 
value of the firm represents the underlying asset on which the call is written. 
Expiration occurs when the debt used in the financing of the firm matures 
and must be repaid.
If the value of the firm is greater than the amount of the debt repayment, 
the owner/manager will repay the debt and claim the residual firm value. 
If, however, the debt repayment amount is greater than the value of the firm, 
the owner/manager will default on the debt and the debtors will claim the 
firm assets as partial repayment of the debt obligation. This decision to 
default by the owner/manager is similar to the refusal to exercise an out- 
of-the money call option.
Prior to the maturity of the debt (i.e., the expiration of the call option), 
the value of the owner/manager’s claim on the firm is directly related to the 
variance of the firm’s operating ezirnings. As the variance of the firm’s 
earnings increase, the value of the call on the residual value increases. Given 
a choice of two investment opportunities with equal expected returns but 
different variances, a rational owner/manager will choose the opportunity 
with the highest variance of returns. There is a greater chance that the 
residual value of the firm after the debt repayment will be larger than if the 
investment opportunity with the lower variance had been chosen.
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A key factor of this scenario is the separation of the financing decision 
and the investment decision. The supphers of debt capital have already 
committed funds prior to management’s investment decision. With the funds 
in hand, management only considers the consequences of the investment 
decision. There exists no immediate constraint on management’s behavior; 
they are free to invest in high risk investments.
A similar type of incentive to invest in risky assets may occur w^hen a 
firm pledges its receivables as collateral in a revolving ABL arrangement. 
If a lender agrees to accept all current and future receivables as collateral 
on a non-recourse basis, the lender has essentially agreed to provide debt 
financing before the actual decision to invest in a particular receivable is 
made. The owner/manager has the incentive to extend trade credit to 
customers who have questionable credit reputations, pledge the resulting 
receivables as collateral, and borrow against these risky receivables without 
regard to the probability of default. To prevent this from occurring, lenders 
in revolving ABLs have established a process of screening and monitoring 
the quality of collateralized receivables. This process links the lender’s 
decision to provide debt financing with the investment to be funded by the 
loan.
Before the lender accepts a borrower’s receivables as collateral, the lender 
performs an initial screening of the receivable accounts. This screening 
involves the classification of the receivables as either eligible or ineligible 
collateral. Some types of accounts, such as intra-company accounts, progress 
billings, seasonal datings or bill-and-hold arrangements, are immediately 
considered ineligible as collateral due to their complicated structure and their 
potential for generating disputes between the lender and borrower. Other 
receivables are reviewed and may be classified as too risky for collateral if 
the account debtors’ payment habits indicate they are poor credit risks. Only 
after the eligible accounts have been identified will the lender advance the 
loan funds and accept the eligible accounts as collateral.
After the initial credit advance, the lender continues to monitor the value 
of the collateral by reviewing the credit sales related documents that reflect 
changes in the receivables and by verifying the outstanding account balances. 
This is done on either a daily or a weekly basis. As new receivables are created, 
the lender advances additional funds only if the receivables represent sales 
to eligible account debtors. By structuring the lending agreement in this way, 
the borrower must make the decision to invest in a receivable with an 
acceptable level of risk before the additional loan funds are advanced from 
the lender. If the new receivable represents a high risk, the lender will not 
accept the account as eligible and will not advance additional funds. This 
linkage between the investment and financing decision resolves the risky 
investment problem.
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U nderinvestment
Myers [16] explains how the underinvestment problem develops when 
debt financing is used by management. He makes the distinction between 
investments in “assets-in-place” and investments in “growth opportunities” 
where growth opportunities are described as options on future assets acquired 
by the firm. He sets up a two-period example where management will 
underinvest by foregoing certain positive net present value (NPV) investment 
projects in which the incremental benefits of the project accrue only to the 
debtholders.
In his two-period model, Myers defines three points in time. At the 
beginning of the first period, the firm issues debt to be repaid at the end 
of period two. At the end of period one, the true value of the firm’s investment 
opportunity is revealed to management and management decides whether 
or not to invest in the project. Since repayment of the debt is assumed to 
be supported entirely by the proceeds of the investment, a decision not to 
invest implies a decision to default on the debt issue at maturity.
When management is required to make the investment decision at the 
end of period one, it decides based on the relationship between the size of 
the positive NPV of the investment project and the present value of the debt 
repayment due at the end of period two. Myers argues that if the NPV of 
the investment is less than the present value of the debt repayment, 
management will pass up the investment. Only if the positive NPV of the 
investment exceeds the present value of the debt repayment will it be in the 
best interest of owner/managers to accept the project. Within the Myers’ 
framework, the suppliers of debt recognize this potential behavior and adjust 
the market price they are willing to pay for the firm’s bond issues.
Due to the structure of the revolving ABL Security Agreement, this 
underinvestment problem cannot exist. In the Myers framework the debt is 
unsecured and the owner/managers receive the loan proceeds prior to the 
investment decision. In an ABL agreement, the debt is secured by assets such 
as inventory and receivables accounts. For the owner/managers to qualify 
for advances against the credit line, investment in the collateralized assets 
must have already taken place. Without the investment, the extension of 
additional credit does not occur. Any future investment decisions should have 
no impact on the repayment of the existing debt. Liquidation of the 
collateralized assets either through the normal course of business or through 
bankruptcy induced liquidation will assure repayment of the loan. The 
problem is resolved ex-ante by linking the investment and lending decision 
within the revolving ABL structure.
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Overinvestment
Ang [1] argues that firms employing debt financing have an incentive 
to retain physical assets that would be disposed of by a firm financed by 100% 
equity. The key to the analysis is that much of the risk associated with owner/ 
managers’ decisions is borne by the debtholders. If the levered firm owns an 
underutilized asset the owner/managers have the choice of either selling the 
asset for a known liquidation value or retaining the asset in the hopes of 
realizing a greater liquidation value in the future. Ang argues that an 
underutilized asset can be thought of as a perpetual out-of-the money option 
and in certain situations, the value of this option to the firm’s management 
is greater than the asset’s current liquidation value. If this occurs, the 
underutilized asset will be retained.
In essence, the Ang argument is similar to the problem of excessively 
risky investment strategies undertaken by management. Management 
chooses to speculate in assets whose unknown future value may or may not 
exceed the current liquidation value. If the assets fail to appreciate in value, 
or depreciate in value, the value of the firm is decreased and the risk of default 
on the outstanding debt is increased.
Ang shows that the construction of an optimal debt contract can resolve 
this overinvestment problem. He argues that the market for corporate 
restructuring allows ineffective existing debt contracts to be replaced by new, 
more effective debt contracts that resolve this overinvestment problem.
This overinvestment problem could occur with inventory investments 
as well as in investments in long term projects. Investment in raw materials 
would be especially sensitive to this type of speculative activity. In Ang’s 
presentation, the problem is resolved through the construction of an optimal 
debt contract during the restructuring of the firm. For firms using revolving 
ABL financing, the optimal contract is the section of the Security Agreement 
that describes the role of collateralized inventory in the secured loan 
agreement. The contract not only prevents overinvestment in inventory, but 
is structured so it also prevents potential abuses of the secured financing 
process itself.
In addition to the reason for overinvestment, borrowers in a commercial 
loan arrangement have an additional incentive to overinvest in inventory. 
If the commercial loan is unsecured, an overinvestment in inventory 
represents an increase in assets; a process that the lender may interpret as 
a decrease in the probability of loss if default occurs. This increase in assets 
may increase the amount of funds that the lender is willing to advance to 
the borrower. Furthermore, if a borrower has excess inventory on hand and 
finds that the realizable value of the collateralized inventory has fallen below 
the amount of the funds borrowed against the assets, there exists the incentive
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to continue to hold the inventory. Even if a working capital term loan is 
collateralized with a blanket inventory lien, the problem still may exist. At 
the extreme, if the borrower does not consider his operation a going concern, 
there is the incentive to invest heavily in inventory and other assets, inflate 
the book value of the assets, obtain term loans by pledging the assets, and 
default on the loan.
To prevent overinvestment in inventory, the revolving ABL structure 
includes a system of inventory monitoring procedures. These procedures, 
outlined in the Security Agreement, are used by the lender to assess the 
collateral value of the inventory prior to the initial loan disbursement and 
every three to six months over the life of the ABL arrangement. This collateral 
value is used to determine the amount of loan funds provided to the borrower.
The first stage in the lender’s monitoring of the inventory includes an 
aging of the inventory accounts and the calculation of inventory turnover. 
This analysis is usually performed for each of the three categories of 
inventory: raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods. The results 
of the analysis are compared to industry information to see if the borrower’s 
inventory investment activities are similar to those of other firms. Inventory 
considered too old by industry standards is disallowed as eligible collateral 
for the ABL. After the inventory accounts have been examined, a physical 
inspection of the inventory by the lender’s audit department is performed 
to verify the reported quantities of inventory. Finally, the lender obtains an 
estimate of the liquidation values for raw materials and finished goods. 
Work-in-process inventory usually has zero liquidation value and is 
ineligible for use as collateral. Once the lender has identified the eligible 
inventory, the appropriate advance rate is applied to the book value to 
determine the amount of loan funds that will be supplied. This advance rate 
is usually low (30%-40%) and reflects the estimated liquidation value of the 
eligible inventory.
This loan structure discourages overinvestment in inventory in many 
ways. First, as noted, inventory classified as too old is not included in the 
lender’s valuation of the eligible collateral. Second, the low advance rate 
insures that the minimum market value, or liquidation value, of the 
collateralized assets is large enough to repay the portion of the loan supported 
by those assets. Third, the low advance rate on inventory and the relatively 
higher advance rate on eligible receivables encourages owner/managers to 
increase efforts to sell existing inventory to acceptable credit customers, thus 
creating new receivables with a greater collateral value in order to secure 
additional financing. Finally, the security interest held by secured lenders 
in the inventory of the borrower is usually a blanket lien that extends to all 
inventory. This structure insures that if overinvestment occurs, the lender 
has a legal claim against the additional inventory owned by the firm even
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though the overinvestment process provides no benefits to the borrower. 
These aspects of the ABL structure remove the potential gain to the borrower 
associated with overinvestment in inventory.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Privately owned firms without access to formal securities markets must rely 
on commercial lenders as sources for their debt financing. Revolving Asset- 
Based Lending agreements, a form of commercial financing whose use has 
increased greatly in recent years, are used to structure and monitor secured 
lending agreements between firms and their debtholders, the commercial 
lenders. These agreements are complex financial contracts that work to 
minimize or resolve debt-related agency problems that occur in privately held 
firms. The costs associated with the resolution of these problems are the 
monitoring costs associated with the secured lender’s activities. These costs 
are passed on to the borrowers by the lenders in the form of explicit loan 
fees.
This paper examines the role of ABL contracts in the control of debt- 
related agency problems. More work needs to be done. There is still a need 
for a more rigorous modeling of agency problems in small private firms. 
This modeling should include the linkage between investment decisions and 
financing decisions. Additional empirical research is also needed in order 
to examine the validity of both existing and future agency models. Along 
the same lines, an examination of the use of both secured and unsecured 
debt may reveal more information about the importance of secured lending 
contracts in the reduction of agency costs. Hopefully, more researchers will 
undertake work in this area in the future.
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